论文信息 - Chess-like Games Are Dominance Solvable in at Most Two Steps

Chess-like Games Are Dominance Solvable in at Most Two Steps

We show that strictly competitive, finite games of perfect information that may end in one of three possible ways can be solved by applying only two rounds of elimination of dominated strategies.

Christian Ewerhart | Christian Ewerhart

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