Walrasian Pricing in Multi-Unit Auctions

Multi-unit auctions are a paradigmatic model, where a seller brings multiple units of a good, while several buyers bring monetary endowments. It is well known that Walrasian equilibria do not always exist in this model, however compelling relaxations such as (Walrasian) envy-free pricing do. In this paper we design an optimal envy-free mechanism for multi-unit auctions with budgets. When the market is even mildly competitive, the approximation ratios of this mechanism are small constants for both the revenue and welfare objectives, and in fact for welfare the approximation converges to 1 as the market becomes fully competitive. We also give an impossibility theorem, showing that truthfulness requires discarding resources and, in particular, is incompatible with (Pareto) efficiency.

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