Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents
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aims to meet this extreme version of the challenge. But there is another popular version of the challenge: no empirical results can do philosophical work in moral arguments. ThroughoutMoral Tribes Greene demonstrates successfully how empirical data about our moral brain and cognitive processing can be incorporated (with further normative premises) into arguments to achieve philosophical conclusions. Philosophers will likely agree that Moral Tribes is ambitious book. It is also an impressive one, weaving empirical work from psychology, evolutionary theory, economics, and neuroscience into a profound ethical argument. Remarkably, it offers a serious philosophical argument for an intelligent general readership. The book also deserves to gain traction in philosophical circles. As a comprehensive state of affairs of contemporary moral psychology it is a valuable resource, and the book offers worthy ethical arguments—from metaethics and normative ethics to moral psychology and practical ethics. Tribes recognizes its ambition, and I suspect that this is just the beginning of new debates in empirically informed moral philosophy.
[1] Margaret Gilbert. On Social Facts , 1989 .
[2] Michael E. Bratman,et al. Faces of Intention: I Intend That We J , 1999 .
[3] Margaret Gilbert. A theory of political obligation : membership, commitment, and the bonds of society , 2006 .
[4] R. Tuomela. Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents , 2013 .