Why Did the Revolutionary Lawyers Confuse Custom and Reason

t Assistant Professor of Law, Stanford University. B.A., Yale, 1980; M.A., Columbia, 1982; Ph.D., The University of Chicago, 1987; J.D., Yale, 1988. Earlier versions of this Article were presented to the American Society for Legal History, the Harvard Law School Legal History Series, and the Stanford Legal History Workshop. I am grateful to participants in all these groups for their comments. I would in particular like to acknowledge helpful suggestions from Keith Baker, Paul Brest, Mauro Cappelletti, Elizabeth Fowler, Charles Gray, Thomas Grey, Brian Levack, David Lieberman, Deborah Weiss, and Harry Wellington. I am especially grateful for sharp criticism by Charles Donahue. This research was supported by The Stanford Legal Research Fund, made possible by a bequest from Ira S. Lillick and by gifts from other friends of the Stanford Law School. 2 John Adams, A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law, in Charles Francis Adams, ed, 3 The Works of John Adams 447, 463 (Charles C. Little and James Brown, 1851). 2 Louis Boullenois, Dissertations sur des Questions qui Naissent de la Contraristg des Loix et des Coutumes xiv, xxii (Mesnier, 1732). 3 Ludwig T. v. Spittler, Vorlesungen iber Politik, in Karl Wfchter, ed, 15 Stmmtliche Werke 130-31 (J.G. Cottaschen, 1837). On the context, see Erwin H6lzle, Das Alte Recht und die Revolution 76-84 (R. Oldenbourg, 1931).