Under What Conditions Can Theoretical Psychology Survive and Prosper? Integrating the Rational and Empirical Epistemologies

This article reexamines some important issues raised by Greenwald, Pratkanis, Leippe, and Baumgardner (1986) conceming the nature oftheory and its role in research progress, practical applications of psychological knowledge, strategies for develqing and evaluating theories, and relations between empirical and theoretical psychology. I argue that Greenwald et al.'s result+entered methods will not solve problems such as confirmation bias and irreplicability and will aggravate other existing problems: lack of viable theory, fragmentation of the field, mechanical fact gathering, limited applicability of psychological knowledge, and noncumulative develryment of facts, with needless duplication ofresults and reinvention ofempirical constructs. I conclude that all ofthese problems are best solved by establishing a balance between the "rational" and "empirical" epistemologies in psychology.