论文信息 - "Nice" Trivial Equilibria in Strategic Market Games

"Nice" Trivial Equilibria in Strategic Market Games

An example of an exchange economy is provided, satisfying all of the assumptions of Dubey and Shubik (1978), for which the trivial Nash equilibrium is the unique equilibrium point of the associated market game. From this example, we are led to propose an argument, related to the intensity of competition, explaining whv there could be no trade at an equilibrium point. (C) 1998 Academic Press.

Jean Jaskold Gabszewicz | Tito Cordella | J. Gabszewicz | T. Cordella

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