Uniqueness and multiplicity of market equilibria on DC power flow networks

Abstract We consider uniqueness and multiplicity of market equilibria in a short-run setup where traded quantities of electricity are transported through a capacitated network in which power flows have to satisfy the classical lossless DC approximation. The firms face fluctuating demand and decide on their production, which is constrained by given capacities. Today, uniqueness of such market outcomes are especially important in more complicated multilevel models for measuring market (in)efficiency. Thus, our findings are important prerequisites for such studies. We show that market equilibria are unique on tree networks under mild assumptions and we also present a priori conditions under which equilibria are unique on cycle networks. On general networks, uniqueness fails to hold and we present simple examples for which multiple equilibria exist. However, we prove different a posteriori criteria for the uniqueness of a given solution and thereby specify properties of unique solutions.

[1]  A.F. Wals,et al.  Strategic generation with conjectured transmission price responses in a mixed transmission pricing system-part II: application , 2004, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems.

[2]  Erik Delarue,et al.  DC power ow in unit commitment models , 2014 .

[3]  A. Conejo,et al.  Pool Strategy of a Producer With Endogenous Formation of Locational Marginal Prices , 2009, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems.

[4]  O. Mangasarian Uniqueness of solution in linear programming , 1979 .

[5]  J. Pang,et al.  Strategic gaming analysis for electric power systems: an MPEC approach , 2000 .

[6]  E. Lazarczyk,et al.  Congestion Management in Electricity Networks: Nodal, Zonal and Discriminatory Pricing , 2012 .

[7]  Martin Schmidt,et al.  Optimal price zones of electricity markets: a mixed-integer multilevel model and global solution approaches , 2019, Optim. Methods Softw..

[8]  Andreas Ehrenmann,et al.  A Comparison of Electricity Market Designs in Networks , 2003, Oper. Res..

[9]  Stephan Dempe,et al.  Foundations of Bilevel Programming , 2002 .

[10]  Stephen C. Peck,et al.  Reliability Management in Competitive Electricity Markets , 1998 .

[11]  E. Andrew Boyd,et al.  A Reduction Technique for Natural Gas Transmission Network Optimization Problems , 2002, Ann. Oper. Res..

[12]  Benjamin F. Hobbs,et al.  Properties of Oligopolistic Market Equilibria in Linearized DC Power Networks with Arbitrage and Supply Function Conjectures , 2001, System Modelling and Optimization.

[13]  Benjamin F. Hobbs,et al.  Nash-Cournot Equilibria in Electric Power Markets with Piecewise Linear Demand Functions and Joint Constraints , 2007, Oper. Res..

[14]  Martin Schmidt,et al.  Global optimization of multilevel electricity market models including network design and graph partitioning , 2019, Discret. Optim..

[15]  O. Mangasarian A simple characterization of solution sets of convex programs , 1988 .

[16]  Alexander Martin,et al.  Transmission and generation investment in electricity markets: The effects of market splitting and network fee regimes , 2016, Eur. J. Oper. Res..

[17]  B. Hobbs,et al.  Complementarity Modeling in Energy Markets , 2012 .

[18]  Yves Smeers,et al.  The EU regulation on cross-border trade of electricity: A two-stage equilibrium model , 2007, Eur. J. Oper. Res..

[19]  Felix F. Wu,et al.  Folk theorems on transmission access: Proofs and counterexamples , 1996 .

[20]  B. Hobbs,et al.  Chapter 3 Complementarity-Based Equilibrium Modeling for Electric Power Markets , 2003 .

[21]  Yves Smeers,et al.  Generation Capacity Expansion in a Risky Environment: A Stochastic Equilibrium Analysis , 2011, Oper. Res..

[22]  Benjamin F. Hobbs,et al.  LCP models of Nash-Cournot competition in bilateral and POOLCO-based power markets , 1999, IEEE Power Engineering Society. 1999 Winter Meeting (Cat. No.99CH36233).

[23]  Gregor Zöttl,et al.  A Framework of Peak Load Pricing with Strategic Firms , 2008, Oper. Res..

[24]  Erik Delarue,et al.  The Flow-Based market coupling in Central Western Europe: concepts and definitions , 2016 .

[25]  Allen J. Wood,et al.  Power Generation, Operation, and Control , 1984 .

[26]  Lars Schewe,et al.  Uniqueness of market equilibrium on a network: A peak-load pricing approach , 2017, Eur. J. Oper. Res..

[27]  Yves Smeers,et al.  Variational Inequality Models of Restructured Electricity Systems , 2001 .

[28]  Yves Smeers,et al.  Spatial Oligopolistic Electricity Models with Cournot Generators and Regulated Transmission Prices , 1999, Oper. Res..

[29]  Benjamin F. Hobbs,et al.  Nash-Cournot Equilibria in Power Markets on a Linearized DC Network with Arbitrage: Formulations and Properties , 2003 .

[30]  Chitru S. Fernando,et al.  The theory of peak-load pricing: A survey , 1995 .

[31]  Richard W. Cottle,et al.  Linear Complementarity Problem. , 1992 .

[32]  B. Hobbs,et al.  Strategic generation with conjectured transmission price responses in a mixed transmission pricing system-part I: formulation , 2004, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems.

[33]  Daniel Ralph,et al.  Using EPECs to Model Bilevel Games in Restructured Electricity Markets with Locational Prices , 2007, Oper. Res..

[34]  D. P. Kothari,et al.  Congestion management in power systems – A review , 2015 .

[35]  Aleksandr Rudkevich,et al.  Analysis of Marginal Carbon Intensities in Constrained Power Networks , 2010, 2010 43rd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences.

[36]  Yves Smeers,et al.  Alternative Models of Restructured Electricity Systems, Part 1: No Market Power , 2001, Oper. Res..