Theory and Method in Comparative Research: Two Strategies

We examine the comparative strategies of Durkheim and Weber and link them to specific presuppositions. While both are compatible with goals of explanation and generalization in sociological analysis, they use different types of explanation and different degrees of generalization to produce variable-based (Durkheimian) and case-based (Weberian) studies. Several authors (e.g., Kapsis; Smelser, b) suggest that these two strategies converge. We show that these strategies are neither congruent nor convergent in their (1) units of analysis, (2) conception of causality, (3) conception of adequate explanation, or (4) logic of analysis. We examine contemporary comparative studies and trace lines of filiation between them and the strategies of Durkheim and Weber. Finally, we suggest how these strategies can be combined in complementary ways to take advantage of the unique strengths of each. One of the few priorities Durkheim and Weber shared was to establish a balance between competing claims of complexity and generality in sociological analysis. They both saw comparative research as the means to do this because such research avoided problems associated with older styles of inquiry. Comparative analysis separated sociology from traditional historical research with its atheoretical attention to detail; it also separated sociology from social philosophy and the philosophy of history with their emphasis on sweeping generalizations (see Zaret, a). These concerns shape Weber's conception of sociology as a science of historical reality. According to Weber, sociology uses ideal types to enable limited generalization about historical divergence (see Zaret, b). Limited