Spectrum access models and auction mechanisms

The demand for spectrum is growing rapidly as data intensive mobile communications and high-definition television are getting more popular. The spectrum regulators are preparing for flexible spectrum use and the implementation of new technologies. To make the appropriate decisions, the regulators need to identify and evaluate the different alternatives. In this paper, we examine a systematic classification of the spectrum access models that can be used together with suitable auctions in order to evaluate and decide between the different models. The basic idea of the taxonomy is to distinguish the different forms of spectrum sharing. For example, multiple systems may coexist in the same frequency band so that the low priority systems may transmit only if the high priority systems are not occupying the band. The hierarchy of the systems can be implemented by using a variety of technologies like centralized databases or distributed sensing devices. The taxonomy clarifies the regulatory alternatives and highlights the differences in ownership and usage rights. We also discuss how to incorporate the new spectrum access models in the auction design and how to support spectrum management using economic modeling and mechanism design framework.

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