Majority-preserving judgment aggregation rules

The literature on judgment aggregation has now been moving from studying impossibility results regarding aggregation rules towards studying specific judgment aggregation rules. Here we focus on a family of rules that is the natural counterpart of the family of Condorcet-consistent voting rules: majority-preserving judgment aggregation rules. A judgment aggregation rule is majority-preserving if whenever issue-wise majority is consistent, the rule should output the majoritarian opinion on each issue. We provide a formal setting for relating judgment aggregation rules to voting rules and propose some basic properties for judgment aggregation rules. We consider six such rules some of which have already appeared in the literature, some others are new. For these rules we consider their relation to known voting rules, to each other, with respect to their discriminating power, and analyse them with respect to the considered properties.

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