Pigouvian pricing and stochastic evolutionary implementation

Abstract We study the implementation of efficient behavior in settings with externalities. A planner would like to ensure that a group of agents make socially optimal choices, but he only has limited information about the agents’ preferences, and can only distinguish individual agents through the actions they choose. We describe the agents’ behavior using a stochastic evolutionary model, assuming that their choice probabilities are given by the logit choice rule. We prove that there is a simple price scheme with the following property: regardless of the realization of preferences, a group of agents subjected to the price scheme will spend the vast majority of time in the long run behaving efficiently. The price scheme defines a game that may possess multiple equilibria, but we are able to obtain a unique and efficient selection from this set because of the stochastic nature of the agents’ choice rule. We conclude by comparing the performance of our price scheme with that of VCG mechanisms.

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