A Theory of Moral Persistence: Crypto-Morality and Political Legitimacy

Why, how, and under what conditions do moral beliefs persist despite institutional pressure for change? Why do the powerful often fail to promote the morality of their authority? This paper addresses these questions by presenting the role of crypto-morality in moral persistence. Crypto-morality is the secret adherence to one morality while practicing another in public. A simple overlapping generations model is developed to examine the conditions under which crypto-morality is practiced, decays and influences the direction of moral change. We demonstrate the empirical relevance of crypto-morality by discussing the moral foundations of political legitimacy in various historical episodes.

[1]  Jared Rubin.  Centralized Institutions and Cascades , 2014 .

[2]  Dingxin Zhao.  The Mandate of Heaven and Performance Legitimation in Historical and Contemporary China , 2009 .

[3]  Marijana Bađun,et al.  Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade / Avner Greif. , 2009 .

[4]  B. Gilley.  Legitimacy and Institutional Change , 2008 .

[5]  E. F. Keyman.  Globalización, Modernidad y Democracia. El caso de Turquía , 2008, Relaciones Internacionales.

[6]  G. Tabellini,et al.  Institutions and Culture , 2007 .

[7]  G. Tabellini.  The Scope of Cooperation: Values and Incentives , 2007 .

[8]  Bruce Gilley,et al.  The meaning and measure of state legitimacy: Results for 72 countries , 2006 .

[9]  Carol H. Shiue.  The Political Economy of Famine Relief in China, 17401820 , 2005, Journal of Interdisciplinary History.

[10]  G. Roland,et al.  Understanding institutional change: Fast-moving and slow-moving institutions , 2004 .

[11]  Soon-Yong Pak.  Cultural Politics and Vocational Religious Education: The Case of Turkey. , 2004 .

[12]  M. Aoki,et al.  Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis , 2002 .

[13]  Alberto Bisin,et al.  The Economics of Cultural Transmission and the Dynamics of Preferences , 2001, J. Econ. Theory.

[14]  C. Thompson.  The Spanish Inquisition , 2000 .

[15]  Alberto Bisin,et al.  A model of cultural transmission, voting and political ideology , 2000 .

[16]  P. Gorski.  Historicizing the Secularization Debate: Church, State, and Society in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe, Ca. 1300 to 1700 , 2000, American Sociological Review.

[17]  H. Kamen.  The Spanish Inquisition: A Historical Revision , 1999 .

[18]  R. Goodin,et al.  A new handbook of political science , 1998 .

[19]  E. Berman,et al.  Sect, Subsidy and Sacrifice: An Economist's View of Ultra-Orthodox Jews , 1998 .

[20]  A. Greif.  Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies , 1994, Journal of Political Economy.

[21]  J. Platteau.  Behind the market stage where real societies exist ‐ part II: The role of moral norms , 1994 .

[22]  L. Iannaccone.  Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-riding in Cults, Communes, and Other Collectives , 1992, Journal of Political Economy.

[23]  B. Lewis,et al.  The Political Language of Islam. , 1991 .

[24]  T. Kuran,et al.  Now out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989 , 1991, World Politics.

[25]  D. North.  Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance: Economic performance , 1990 .

[26]  B. Lewis,et al.  The political language of Islam , 1989 .

[27]  T. Kuran,et al.  PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION, POLICY CONTINUITY AND COLLECTIVE CONSERVATISM* , 1987 .

[28]  M. Kimmel,et al.  The Institutions of France Under the Absolute Monarchy, 1598-1789.@@@Paris, capitale au temps de Richelieu et de Mazarin. , 1981 .

[29]  K. Persson.  An Economic History of Europe: Institutions and growth , 2010 .

[30]  J. Mokyr,et al.  The European enlightenment, the industrial revolution, and modern economic growth , 2007 .

[31]  Qweak Collaboration Willem T. H. van Oers.  The Institutions , 2007 .

[32]  Wang Yinchu,et al.  The case of China , 2002 .

[33]  John R. Edwards,et al.  :The Spanish Inquisition: A Historical Revision , 2000 .

[34]  M. Levi.  Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism: Frontmatter , 1997 .

[35]  J. Abun-Nasr.  A history of the Maghrib in the Islamic period , 1987 .

[36]  R. Frank.  If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function, Would He Want One with a Conscience? Reply , 1987 .

[37]  C. Roth.  A History of the Marranos , 1932 .