Transparent Assessment of the Supervision Information in China’s Food Safety: A Fuzzy-ANP Comprehensive Evaluation Method

Improving transparency of food safety supervision information can reduce the occurrence of information asymmetry, decrease food safety incidents, and promote socially joint regulation for food safety. In this study, an index system of food safety supervision information transparency (FSSIT) is constructed using the fuzzy-ANP comprehensive evaluation model. Using this system, the FSSIT in China is evaluated. A total of 1651 questionnaires containing 139525 data are collected from food and drug administration (FDA), consumer association (CA), and media at the central, provincial, prefectural, and county levels. Empirical results indicate that the FSSIT achieves a qualified level; however, the works of FDA, CA, and media still present deficiencies. The information transparency in the entirety presents deficiencies and gradually declines when that in the administrative level decreases. The economic development level indirectly determines the transparency level, and the transparency level does not conform to China’s current economic development level.

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