论文信息 - Experimental study of market reputation mechanisms

Experimental study of market reputation mechanisms

We experimentally compare low-information, high-information and self-reporting reputation mechanisms. The results indicate players strategically reacted to the reputation mechanisms, with higher information mechanisms increasing market efficiency.

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