Transparency about past, present and future conduct: Experimental evidence on the impact of competitiveness

Transparency relates to communication and information about the conduct of firms. Transparency can relate to the past, the present, and the future and it can vary in format, content, and reliability. In this paper I review experimental evidence which relates to the impact of transparency on the competitiveness of markets.

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