Truthful prioritization for dynamic bandwidth sharing

We design a protocol for dynamic prioritization of data on shared routers such as untethered 3G/4G devices. The mechanism prioritizes bandwidth in favor of users with the highest value, and is incentive compatible, so that users can simply report their true values for network access. A revenue pooling mechanism also aligns incentives for sellers, so that they will choose to use prioritization methods that retain the incentive properties on the buy-side. In this way, the design allows for an open architecture. In addition to revenue pooling, the technical contribution is to identify a class of stochastic demand models and a prioritization scheme that provides allocation monotonicity. Simulation results confirm efficiency gains from dynamic prioritization relative to prior methods, as well as the effectiveness of revenue pooling.

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