Mechanisms for norm emergence in multiagent societies

Norms are shared expectations of behaviours that exist in human societies. Norms help societies by increasing the predictability of individual behaviours and by improving co-operation and collaboration among members. Norms have been of interest to Multiagent Systems (MAS) researchers as software agents may violate norms due to their autonomy. In order to built robust MAS that are norm compliant and systems that evolve and adapt norms dynamically, the study of norms is crucial. Our research focuses on how norms emerge in agent societies. In this paper we propose two mechanisms for norm emergence.

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