Compositional Synthesis of Leakage Resilient Programs

A promising approach to defend against side channel attacks is to build programs that are leakage resilient, in a formal sense. One such formal notion of leakage resilience is the n-threshold-probing model proposed in the seminal work by Ishai et al.i¾?[16]. In a recent worki¾?[9], Eldib and Wang have proposed a method for automatically synthesizing programs that are leakage resilient according to this model, for the case $$n=1$$. In this paper, we show that the n-threshold-probing model of leakage resilience enjoys a certain compositionality property that can be exploited for synthesis. We use the property to design a synthesis method that efficiently synthesizes leakage-resilient programs in a compositional manner, for the general case of $$n > 1$$. We have implemented a prototype of the synthesis algorithm, and we demonstrate its effectiveness by synthesizing leakage-resilient versions of benchmarks taken from the literature.