Weak Undominance in Scoring Rule Elections
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] Ruth C. Silva,et al. Making votes count , 1963 .
[2] Stephen Coate,et al. An Economic Model of Representative Democracy , 1997 .
[3] Thomas A. Rietz,et al. An experimental study of voting rules and polls in three-candidate elections , 1996 .
[4] Jean-François Laslier,et al. Approval voting: three examples , 2006, Int. J. Game Theory.
[5] Arnaud Dellis. Would Letting People Vote for Multiple Candidates Yield Policy Moderation , 2009 .
[6] Ben Lockwood,et al. Multiple Equilibria in the Citizen-Candidate Model of Representative Democracy , 2002 .
[8] Gary W. Cox,et al. Electoral Equilibrium under Alternative Voting Institutions , 1987 .
[9] S. Hart,et al. HANDBOOK OF GAME THEORY , 2011 .
[10] Roger B. Myerson,et al. Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games , 2002, J. Econ. Theory.
[11] Roger B. Myerson,et al. Theoretical Comparisons of Electoral Systems , 1998 .
[12] Francesco De Sinopoli. A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy , 2004, Games Econ. Behav..
[13] Ben Lockwood,et al. When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable? , 2004, Games Econ. Behav..
[14] Francesco De Sinopoli. Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule , 2000, Soc. Choice Welf..
[15] A. Gibbard. Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result , 1973 .
[16] T. Feddersen,et al. Rational Voting and Candidate Entry Under Plurality Rule , 1990 .
[17] M. Satterthwaite. Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions , 1975 .