LIDA: A Computational Model of Global Workspace Theory and Developmental Learning

In this paper, we present LIDA, a working model of, and theoretical foundation for, machine consciousness. LIDA’s architecture and mechanisms were inspired by a variety of computational paradigms and LIDA implements the Global Workspace Theory of consciousness. The LIDA architecture’s cognitive modules include perceptual associative memory, episodic memory, functional consciousness, procedural memory and action-selection. Cognitive robots and software agents controlled by the LIDA architecture will be capable of multiple learning mechanisms. With artificial feelings and emotions as primary motivators and learning facilitators, such systems will ‘live’ through a developmental period during which they will learn in multiple, human-like ways to act effectively in their environments. We also provide a comparison of the LIDA model with other models of consciousness.

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