Endogenous Coalition Formation in Global Pollution Control: A Partition Function Approach

This important book, written by some of the leading scholars in the field, provides a comprehensive overview of recent advances in coalition theory and presents both the latest theoretical developments and novel applications in the field of economics.

[1]  David de Meza,et al.  Creating a Good Atmosphere: Minimum Participation for Tackling the 'Greenhouse Effect' , 1993 .

[2]  S. Barrett.  Self-enforcing international environmental agreements , 1994 .

[3]  C. Carraro,et al.  Strategies for the international protection of the environment , 1993 .

[4]  C. Carraro,et al.  Endogenous Minimum Participation in International Environmental Treaties , 2003 .

[5]  Michael Finus,et al.  Game theory and international environmental cooperation: any practical application? , 2002 .

[6]  Robert J. Aumann,et al.  16. Acceptable Points in General Cooperative n-Person Games , 1959 .

[7]  Michael Finus,et al.  Game theory and international environmental cooperation: any practical application? , 2002 .

[8]  Bianca Rundshagen,et al.  Toward a positive theory of coalition formation and endogenous instrumental choice in global pollution control , 1998 .

[9]  Tim Jeppesen,et al.  Commitment and Fairness in Environmental Games , 2002 .

[10]  Philippe L. Toint,et al.  Financial transfers to ensure cooperative international optimality in stock pollutant abatement , 1997 .

[11]  J. Friedman.  Game theory with applications to economics , 1986 .

[12]  Sang-Seung Yi,et al.  Endogenous formation of coalitions in oligopoly , 1992 .

[13]  J. Neumann,et al.  Theory of games and economic behavior , 1945, 100 Years of Math Milestones.

[14]  Francis Bloch,et al.  Non-cooperative models of coalition formation in games with spillovers , 2003 .

[15]  Domenico Siniscalco,et al.  R&D Cooperation and the Stability of International Environmental Agreements , 1995 .