Reasoning and Rationality

This paper considers certain experimental tasks used by cognitive psychologists, performance on which has been thought to show that intelligent and able human subjects are `irrational'. It is argued that the responses judged to be `correct' (which the subjects usually fail to give) are so only in a pedantic sense. They are the responses that would follow if thinking was in accord with some simple abstract model and if it could legitimately be claimed that following the model constituted rationality. The models chosen are shown to be inappropriate for the purpose. Furthermore, no account is taken of the subjects' desire genuinely to participate in the experiment-to make sense of the task given and respond according to that sense. Subjects do not without specific instruction try to dissect out an abstract model and respond according to that. It is concluded that the responses actually given are prima facie evidence of rationality in the subjects.

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