Adversarial control scheme for an islanded power plant

This paper addresses the concept of an adversarial control scheme designed for an islanded power plant with input hard constraints. The system evolves in the discrete-time domain and is subject to performance and alarm state constraints, both described by convex and compact polyhedral sets, that represent valid domains of safe operation under the effect of a stabilizing output-feedback controller. An attacker succeeds in gaining access to the automatic generation control unit of the system and sends false control commands, whenever necessary, attempting to drive the state vector outside the performance set, at the maximum admissible rate, without violating any alarm constraints. Simulation studies highlight the effects of the adversarial policies on the physical plant.

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