Transnational policing in Southern Africa: moving towards a centralized European model of police cooperation?

The nature of cross-border police cooperation in Southern Africa has undergone radical transformation over the past two decades. Numerous international treaties and agreements now formalize and enhance the conduct and effectiveness of police cooperation. Legislative and policy initiatives have given shape and form to a framework of cooperation, with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its constituent Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO) at its centre. The establishment of Afripol in 2015 suggests that transnational policing is becoming more centralized, similar in ways to the EU transnational policing infrastructure. The chapter questions the wisdom of using EU structures and processes for police cooperation as a benchmark. Introduction The creation of the African Police Cooperation Organisation (Afripol) in 2015 represented a new departure for police cooperation in Africa. African governments which were renowned for their ‘regionalism’ appeared to have embraced the ideal of ‘centralization’ which was more common to the neighbouring continent of Europe. Although the founding Statute of Afripol (2017) said nothing of the EU or its primary centralized agency for police cooperation, Europol, it is widely expected that European experiences will have a significant influence on the evolution of its structures, processes and practices (Dietrich, 2016; Vorrath and Zoppei, 2017). Due to the relentless introduction of centralized agencies and legal and procedural instruments within the EU area since the early 1990s, the EU policing project is widely considered to be the prime case of regional police cooperation from which generalizations can be drawn (Anderson et al., 1995; Walsh, 1998; Occhipinti, 2003; Den Boer, 2010; Dietrich 2016). Moreover, the Chief Commissioner of the Seychelles Police explicitly announced that ‘Afripol ... will be similar to other continental bodies like Europe’s Europol for example’ (Uranie and Nicette, 2014), while one Rwandan newspaper anticipated that ‘Afripol will act on the model of Europol’ (Tumwebaze, 2013). This chapter will consider whether and to what extent the creation of Afripol represents a shift towards a more centralized ‘European’ model of transnational policing. Since Afripol remains an embryonic organization for police cooperation and has not, at the time of writing, published its first annual report, the chapter will consider the recent evolution of regional structures and processes for police cooperation and evaluate whether there is an identifiable trend towards centralization. Due in part to the size of Afripol’s membership base (40 participant states), and the fact that one of the authors is based at the University of Cape Town, South Africa, the evaluation will be concerned primarily with the conduct and evolution of transnational policing in Southern Africa, as a distinct region. Unfortunately, much of the research on transnational policing in Southern Africa is thin on the ground, so the chapter must rely on research which is almost a decade old in parts (see Hills, 2008; van der Spuy, 2009; Tait and van der Spuy, 2010). The evolution of Afripol The chiefs of police of 40 African countries, ranging from Algeria to Zimbabwe, adopted a recommendation to establish the African Police Cooperation Organisation (Afripol) at the 22 nd African Regional Conference of Interpol held in Oran, Algeria on 10-12 September 2013 (Recommendation No. 7). The recommendation was driven by deepening concerns about the challenges of combatting increasingly complex forms of terrorism and organized crime in several African sub-regions. Recognizing the need for greater police cooperation at strategic, tactical and operational levels, Afripol is designed to facilitate the coordinated assessment of threats, analysis of criminal intelligence, the harmonization of police methods, the exchange of best practices and investigative techniques, and the planning and implementation of actions, and the strengthening of African police capabilities. Although the recommendation was adopted at an Interpol Regional Conference, the recommendation provided that Afripol would subsequently derive its legal and juridical personality from the African Union (AU). Following four years of negotiation between regional police forums and government representatives from the participating states, the founding Statute of Afripol, the African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation, was ratified in 2017 at the 28 th Summit of the African Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. It required the new organization to: establish a framework for police cooperation at the strategic, operational and tactical levels between the Participant State police institutions; facilitate the prevention, detection and investigation of transnational organized crime in coordination and collaboration with national, regional and international police institutions; prepare a harmonized African strategy to fight against transnational organized crime, terrorism and cyber-crime; and enhance coordination among police forces (Art. 3). More specifically, in order to achieve these objectives, it should assist Member States’ police institutions to set up a framework of cooperation at the national, regional, and international levels; assist Member States’ police institutions to improve their efficiency and effectiveness; facilitate the sharing of information or intelligence to prevent and combat transnational organized crimes, terrorism and cybercrime; enable planning and coordination of joint patrols and operations; and develop appropriate communication strategies, systems and databases, amongst other requirements (Art. 4). With its headquarters in Algeria and funded by the budget of the AU, Afripol’s organizational structure is headed by a Director, who is supported by a Secretariat, National Liaison Offices, regular ‘session’ meetings of a General Assembly of the chiefs of police, a President of the General Assembly and a broader ‘Steering Committee’ of AU officials (Arts. 7 13). However, it is still too early to determine the extent to which Afripol will redefine the transnational policing landscape in Southern Africa. Afripol’s website (afripol.peaceau.org), within 12 months of its official launch, did not contain any data or entries under its ‘documents’ tab, nor had it published any threat assessments or reports on its website. Moreover, its founding statute does not outline what the ‘framework of cooperation’ or the ‘appropriate communication strategies, systems and databases’ should look like. The frequent use of the terms ‘assist’ and ‘facilitate’ in Article 4 suggests that it will have limited power, if any, to require cooperation to take place on the ground. Furthermore, questions have already been raised about the quality of Afripol’s leadership after the first President of the Afripol General Assembly, Director General of the Algerian Police, Abdelghani Hamel, was dismissed amid a drug-trafficking scandal in Algeria a little over a year after Afripol’s official launch (Rouaba, 2018). In the absence of any official Afripol annual reports or threat assessments to determine the level of impact that the organization has had in its first 12 months of operation, the chapter will turn to developments in one distinct region within Africa, namely Southern Africa, to consider whether the establishment of Afripol represents a shift towards a centralized model of transnational policing. The evolution of the Southern African framework for transnational policing: a trend towards centralization The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was established in 1992 to replace a number of inter-governmental networks and conferences responsible for facilitating cooperation in socio-economic, political and security policy areas. It has 16 Participant States, including: Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, eSwatini and Zambia, amongst others, as of 2018. One of the catalysts for its establishment was the publication of a document by one of its forerunners, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), entitled ‘SADCC: Towards Economic Integration’, which had argued that a higher level of cooperation would enable the countries of the region to address problems of national development, such as food security and poor infrastructure, and increase regional trade and cross border investment, especially at a time when the system of apartheid and the remaining remnants of colonialism and the Cold War were being dismantled across Southern Africa (SADC 1992). The proposals were subsequently adopted in a Declaration and Treaty at a summit of heads of state and government in Windhoek, Namibia in 1992, which tasked the organization with fostering greater socio-economic, political and security cooperation in the region (Art. 21 and 22 of the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community 1992). Reflecting an ethos of democratization, the new inter-governmental organization consisted of a regular summit of governmental leaders of the participating states, a council of ministers in each of its primary policy areas, a tribunal to resolve legal conflicts and a secretariat. However, initial attempts to establish mechanisms of police and security cooperation through the organization proved challenging. Countries and regions within Southern Africa continued to be affected by serious disorder and inter-state conflict throughout the 1990s (van der Spuy, 2009). Political destabilization in the region had created weak political, social, economic and legal structures, and the public police in many countries were still viewed by civilians as agents and defenders of brutal, oppressive and corrupt regimes (Dissel, 2010). The civil strife and political tensions resulted in significant delays in the development of key institutions, such as the SADC’s tri