An Informational Rationale for Political Parties

preferences are not sufficiently close to the party's platform. We find that when party labels are very informa? tive, the parties' platforms converge. When party labels are less informa? tive, however, platforms diverge, because taking an extreme position allows a party to reduce the variance of its members' preferences. As par? ties become less able to impose costs on their members, or less able to screen out certain types of candi? dates, their platforms move further apart.

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