Tit-for-tat or win-stay, lose-shift?

[1]  Robert van Rooij,et al.  The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure , 2007, Stud Logica.

[2]  Arne Traulsen,et al.  Stochastic payoff evaluation increases the temperature of selection. , 2007, Journal of theoretical biology.

[3]  Drew Fudenberg,et al.  Imitation Processes with Small Mutations , 2004, J. Econ. Theory.

[4]  L. Imhof,et al.  Stochasticity and evolutionary stability. , 2006, Physical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear, and soft matter physics.

[5]  H. Ohtsuki,et al.  A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks , 2006, Nature.

[6]  M. Nowak,et al.  Evolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher process , 2006, Journal of mathematical biology.

[7]  D. Fudenberg,et al.  Evolutionary cycles of cooperation and defection. , 2005, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.

[8]  C. Hauert,et al.  Coevolutionary dynamics: from finite to infinite populations. , 2004, Physical review letters.

[9]  D. Fudenberg,et al.  Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations , 2004, Nature.

[10]  L. Dugatkin.  Do guppies play TIT FOR TAT during predator inspection visits? , 1988, Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology.

[11]  R. Axelrod,et al.  Evolutionary Dynamics , 2004 .

[12]  Daniel B. Neill,et al.  Optimality under noise: higher memory strategies for the alternating prisoner's dilemma. , 2001, Journal of theoretical biology.

[13]  J. Wakano,et al.  A simple learning strategy that realizes robust cooperation better than Pavlov in Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma , 2001, Journal of Ethology.

[14]  W. Godwin.  Article in Press , 2000 .

[15]  L M Wahl,et al.  The Continuous Prisoner:s Dilemma: I. Linear Reactive Strategies , 1999 .

[16]  M. Nowak,et al.  The continuous Prisoner's dilemma: II. Linear reactive strategies with noise. , 1999, Journal of theoretical biology.

[17]  M. Doebeli,et al.  Variable investment, the Continuous Prisoner's Dilemma, and the origin of cooperation , 1999, Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences.

[18]  K. Sigmund,et al.  The efficiency of adapting aspiration levels , 1998, Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences.

[19]  M. Milinski,et al.  Working memory constrains human cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma. , 1998, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.

[20]  G. Roberts,et al.  Development of cooperative relationships through increasing investment , 1998, Nature.

[21]  M. Nowak,et al.  Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring , 1998, Nature.

[22]  D. Fudenberg,et al.  The Theory of Learning in Games , 1998 .

[23]  D. Kraines,et al.  Evolution of Learning among Pavlov Strategies in a Competitive Environment with Noise , 1995 .

[24]  Martin A. Nowak,et al.  Automata, repeated games and noise , 1995 .

[25]  Marcus Frean.  The prisoner’s dilemma without synchrony , 1994, Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences.

[26]  M. Nowak,et al.  The Alternating Prisoner's Dilemma , 1994 .

[27]  D. Fudenberg,et al.  Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players , 1994 .

[28]  D. Fudenberg,et al.  Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 with Funding from Working Paper Department of Economics the Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information , 2022 .

[29]  Robert J. Aumann,et al.  Long-Term Competition - A Game-Theoretic Analysis , 1994, Essays in Game Theory.

[30]  M. Nowak,et al.  A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma game , 1993, Nature.

[31]  H. Young,et al.  The Evolution of Conventions , 1993 .

[32]  R. Rob,et al.  Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games , 1993 .

[33]  M. Nowak,et al.  Evolutionary games and spatial chaos , 1992, Nature.

[34]  M. Nowak,et al.  Tit for tat in heterogeneous populations , 1992, Nature.

[35]  M. Nowak,et al.  The evolution of stochastic strategies in the Prisoner's Dilemma , 1990 .

[36]  D. Fudenberg,et al.  Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games , 1990 .

[37]  P. Richerson,et al.  The evolution of indirect reciprocity , 1989 .

[38]  D. Kraines,et al.  Pavlov and the prisoner's dilemma , 1989 .

[39]  R. Boyd,et al.  No pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game , 1987, Nature.

[40]  M. Milinski.  TIT FOR TAT in sticklebacks and the evolution of cooperation , 1987, Nature.

[41]  Drew Fudenberg,et al.  The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information , 1986 .

[42]  P. Molander.  The Optimal Level of Generosity in a Selfish, Uncertain Environment , 1985 .

[43]  G. Wilkinson.  Reciprocal food sharing in the vampire bat , 1984, Nature.

[44]  M. Midgley.  Sociobiology. , 1984, Journal of medical ethics.

[45]  R. Selten,et al.  Gaps in Harley's argument on evolutionarily stable learning rules and in the logic of “tit for tat” , 1984, Behavioral and Brain Sciences.

[46]  W. Hamilton,et al.  The evolution of cooperation. , 1984, Science.

[47]  R. Trivers.  The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism , 1971, The Quarterly Review of Biology.

[48]  Samuel Karlin,et al.  A First Course on Stochastic Processes , 1968 .

[49]  W. Hamilton.  The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I. , 1964, Journal of theoretical biology.

[50]  V. Wynne-Edwards.  Animal dispersion in relation to social behaviour , 1962 .

[51]  E. Hill.  Journal of Theoretical Biology , 1961, Nature.