What Can Laboratory Experiments Teach Us About Emissions Permit Market Design?

The laboratory provides a test bed to inform many design choices for emissions permit markets. Experiments are sometimes strongly motivated and structured by specific theoretical models and predictions, but in other cases the experiment itself can be the model of the market and regulatory environment. We review specific experimental applications that address design issues for permit auction rules, permit expiration dates and banking, liability rules, and regulatory enforcement.

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