Semantics for Opaque Contexts

In this paper, we outline an approach to giving extensional truth-theoretic semantics for what have traditionally been seen as opaque sentential contexts. 2 If the approach outlined here is correct, it resolves a longstanding complex of problems in metaphysics, the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language. We take as our starting point the requirement that any semantics for a natural language be compositional, that is, that it provide an interpretation of each of the infinity of sentences in it on the basis of a finite primitive vocabulary and a finite number of rules. At least since Frege, 3 it has been recognized that sentences such as (1),

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