Local Topology Attacks in Smart Grids

It has been shown that an attacker can stealthily launch false data injection attacks against the state estimation without knowing the full topology and parameter information of the entire power network. In this paper, we propose a heuristic yet effective method to determine a feasible attacking region of a single line, which requires less network information. We use six IEEE standard systems to validate the proposed attacking strategy. This paper can reveal the vulnerability of the real-time topology of a power grid and is very helpful to develop effective protection strategies against topology attacks in smart grids.

[1]  Haibo He,et al.  Multi-Contingency Cascading Analysis of Smart Grid Based on Self-Organizing Map , 2013, IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security.

[2]  Bo Zeng,et al.  Vulnerability Analysis of Power Grids With Line Switching , 2013, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems.

[3]  Wen-Long Chin,et al.  Blind False Data Injection Attack Using PCA Approximation Method in Smart Grid , 2015, IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid.

[4]  Henrik Sandberg,et al.  Stealth Attacks and Protection Schemes for State Estimators in Power Systems , 2010, 2010 First IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications.

[5]  Jianhui Wang,et al.  Real-time intrusion detection in power system operations , 2013, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems.

[6]  Yilin Mo,et al.  False Data Injection Attacks in Control Systems , 2010 .

[7]  Natalia Alguacil,et al.  Analysis of Electric Grid Interdiction With Line Switching , 2010, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems.

[8]  Zuyi Li,et al.  Modeling Load Redistribution Attacks in Power Systems , 2011, IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid.

[9]  Zuyi Li,et al.  Quantitative Analysis of Load Redistribution Attacks in Power Systems , 2012, IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems.

[10]  Hamed Mohsenian Rad,et al.  Distributed Internet-Based Load Altering Attacks Against Smart Power Grids , 2011, IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid.

[11]  Gabriela Hug,et al.  Vulnerability Assessment of AC State Estimation With Respect to False Data Injection Cyber-Attacks , 2012, IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid.

[12]  Kameshwar Poolla,et al.  Building Efficiency and Sustainability in the Tropics ( SinBerBEST ) , 2012 .

[13]  Bruno Sinopoli,et al.  Integrity Data Attacks in Power Market Operations , 2011, IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid.

[14]  Ying Jun Zhang,et al.  Using Covert Topological Information for Defense Against Malicious Attacks on DC State Estimation , 2014, IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications.

[15]  Zuyi Li,et al.  Local Load Redistribution Attacks in Power Systems With Incomplete Network Information , 2014, IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid.

[16]  Zuyi Li,et al.  Modeling of Local False Data Injection Attacks With Reduced Network Information , 2015, IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid.

[17]  H. Vincent Poor,et al.  Machine Learning Methods for Attack Detection in the Smart Grid , 2015, IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks and Learning Systems.

[18]  Lang Tong,et al.  On Topology Attack of a Smart Grid: Undetectable Attacks and Countermeasures , 2013, IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications.

[19]  Ying Jun Zhang,et al.  Defending mechanisms against false-data injection attacks in the power system state estimation , 2011, 2011 IEEE GLOBECOM Workshops (GC Wkshps).

[20]  R D Zimmerman,et al.  MATPOWER: Steady-State Operations, Planning, and Analysis Tools for Power Systems Research and Education , 2011, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems.

[21]  Peng Ning,et al.  False data injection attacks against state estimation in electric power grids , 2011, TSEC.

[22]  Zhu Han,et al.  Detection of false data injection in power grid exploiting low rank and sparsity , 2013, 2013 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC).

[23]  Hamed Mohsenian Rad,et al.  False data injection attacks with incomplete information against smart power grids , 2012, 2012 IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM).

[24]  Zhengrui Qin,et al.  Unidentifiable Attacks in Electric Power Systems , 2012, 2012 IEEE/ACM Third International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems.

[25]  Lang Tong,et al.  Limiting false data attacks on power system state estimation , 2010, 2010 44th Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems (CISS).

[26]  J. Salmeron,et al.  Worst-Case Interdiction Analysis of Large-Scale Electric Power Grids , 2009, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems.

[27]  H. Vincent Poor,et al.  Strategic Protection Against Data Injection Attacks on Power Grids , 2011, IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid.