Social Status, Entry and Predation: The Case of British Shipping Cartels 1879-1929

The authors incorporate social status and regional affiliation--two variables of central sociological interest--into an economic analysis of entry and predation. They build on Scott Morton's (1997) examination of entry and predation in the merchant shipping industry and examine whether the social status of an entrant owner impacts on the predation behavior of the incumbent cartels. The authors find that high social status entrants are significantly less likely (40 percent) to be preyed upon than the low social status entrants. They discuss several interpretations of this result. Subsequent analysis supports the hypothesis that cartel members use social status as an indicator of an entrant's propensity to be a cooperative cartel participant. Copyright 1999 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd

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