Econometrics of Contracts: an Assessment of Developments in the Empirical Literature on Contracting

[fre] Parce qu'elles sont susceptibles d'influer sur les legislations contractuelles, les politiques et les pratiques industrielles, il est important que les theories des contrats se basent, autant que possible, sur des travaux empiriques solides. Cet article fait un bilan de ces etudes en insistant plus particulierement sur les contributions de la theorie de l'agence et de la theorie des couts de transaction. Apres une breve presentation de ces approches theoriques, nous discutons des propositions testables qu'elles generent et des resultats des travaux econometriques sur le sujet. Des deux, la theorie des couts de transaction est celle qui a eu le plus de succes pour generer des propositions et expliquer les comportements contractuels. [eng] Given their potential to affect contract law, antitrust policy, and business practice, it is important that theories of contracting stand on an empirical footing as solid as possible. This article reviews the empirical literature on contracting with emphasis on the relative contributions of agency and transaction cost theories. After describing their common underlying structure, we discuss the theories' testable implications and the associated econometric evidence. Of the two, transaction cost economics has had more success both generating predictions and explaining contracting behavior.

[1]  James A. Brickley Incentive Conflicts and Contractual Restraints: Evidence from Franchising* , 1999, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[2]  D. Allen,et al.  The Role of Risk in Contract Choice , 1999 .

[3]  Jean Tirole,et al.  Incomplete contracts: Where do we stand? , 1999 .

[4]  Margaret E. Slade,et al.  Incentive Contracting and the Franchise Decision , 1998 .

[5]  M. Slade,et al.  Retail Contracting: Theory and Practice , 2003 .

[6]  O. Williamson,et al.  The mechanisms of governance , 1996 .

[7]  Anjan V. Thakor,et al.  Firms, Contracts and Financial Structures. , 1996 .

[8]  O. Williamson,et al.  Transaction Cost Economics , 1995 .

[9]  Peter G. Klein,et al.  Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment , 1995 .

[10]  B. Lyons Specific investment, economies of scale, and the make-or-buy decision: A test of transaction cost theory , 1995 .

[11]  Francine Lafontaine,et al.  Double-Sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts , 1995 .

[12]  B. Lyons Contracts and Specific Investment: An Empirical Test of Transaction Cost Theory , 1994 .

[13]  Stephen Craig Pirrong,et al.  Contracting Practices in Bulk Shipping Markets: A Transactions Cost Explanation , 1993, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[14]  Kenneth J. Reynolds,et al.  The efficiency of incomplete contracts: an empirical analysis of air force engine procurement , 1993 .

[15]  D. Allen,et al.  Transaction Costs and the Design of Cropshare Contracts , 1993 .

[16]  D. Allen,et al.  The "Back Forty" on a Handshake: Specific Assets, Reputation, and the Structure of Farmland Contracts , 1992 .

[17]  Francine Lafontaine Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results , 1992 .

[18]  K. Leffler,et al.  Transactions Costs and the Efficient Organization of Production: A Study of Timber-Harvesting Contracts , 1991, Journal of Political Economy.

[19]  Scott E. Masten,et al.  Pretia ex Machina? Prices and Process in Long-Term Contracts , 1991, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[20]  Paul R. Milgrom,et al.  Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design , 1991 .

[21]  Oliver Hart Is 'Bounded Rationality' an Important Element of a Theory of Institutions? , 1990 .

[22]  Jean Tirole,et al.  The theory of the firm , 1989 .

[23]  Paul L. Joskow,et al.  Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts: The Case of Coal , 1988, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[24]  P. Joskow Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence , 1988 .

[25]  S. Masten,et al.  Mitigating Contractual Hazards: Unilateral Options and Contract Length , 1988 .

[26]  Victor P. Goldberg,et al.  Quantity and Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts: A Case Study of Petroleum Coke , 1987, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[27]  S. Masten Equity, opportunism, and the design of contractual relations , 1987 .

[28]  Sanford J. Grossman,et al.  The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration , 1986 .

[29]  Bengt Holmstrom,et al.  The Theory of Contracts , 1986 .

[30]  Scott E. Masten,et al.  Efficient Adaptation in Long-term Contracts: Take-or-Pay Provisions for Natural Gas , 1985 .

[31]  Ralph A. Winter,et al.  The Economics of Franchise Contracts , 1985, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[32]  Thomas W. Ross,et al.  Product Warranties and Double Moral Hazard , 1985 .

[33]  S. Masten The Organization of Production: Evidence from the Aerospace Industry , 1984, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[34]  Thomas M. Palay,et al.  Comparative Institutional Economics: The Governance of Rail Freight Contracting , 1984, The Journal of Legal Studies.

[35]  David C. Schmittlein,et al.  Integration of the sales force: an empirical examination , 1984 .

[36]  Benjamin Klein,et al.  The Economics of Block Booking , 1983, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[37]  K. Crocker Vertical Integration and the Strategic use of Private Information , 1983 .

[38]  R. Myerson Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems , 1982 .

[39]  Y. Barzel,et al.  Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets , 1982, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[40]  Victor P. Goldberg,et al.  Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts , 2012, Framing Contract Law.

[41]  Kirk Monteverde,et al.  You have printed the following article : Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry , 2007 .

[42]  Steven Shavell,et al.  On the Design of Contracts and Remedies for Breach , 1981 .

[43]  George L. Priest,et al.  A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty , 1981 .

[44]  O. Williamson Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations , 1979, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[45]  J. Heckman Sample selection bias as a specification error , 1979 .

[46]  B. Klein,et al.  Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process , 1978, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[47]  O. Williamson,et al.  Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. , 1977 .

[48]  Joseph E. Stiglitz,et al.  Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping , 1974 .

[49]  O. Williamson The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations , 1971 .