Expert Judgment: Is More Information Better?

Two groups of professional auditors (expert ns = 10 and 11) and one group of 11 accounting students (novices) made judgments for 32 hypothetical auditing cases which were based on 8 dimensions of accounting-related information. Analyses indicated that the experts did not differ significantly from the novices in the number of significant dimensions; both the professionals and the students had roughly three significant factors. When evaluating the information, however, the experts' judgments primarily reflected one source of information, with other cues having secondary impart. In comparison, no single cue was dominant for the students' judgments. These results were interpreted to indicate that the nonuse of information by experts does not necessarily indicate a cognitive limitation. Instead, experts may have better abilities to focus on relevant information. The professional auditors also exhibited greater consistency and consensus than did the students. In contrast to much previous work, the experts here are viewed as being skilled and competent judges.

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