On Self-Interested Agents in Vehicular Networks With Car-to-Car Gossiping

As more and more cars are equipped with global positioning system (GPS) and Wi-Fi transmitters, it becomes easier to design systems that will allow cars to autonomously interact with each other, e.g., regarding traffic on the roads. Indeed, car manufacturers are already equipping their cars with such devices. Although, currently, these systems are a proprietary, we envision a natural evolution where agent applications will be developed for vehicular systems, e.g., to improve car routing in dense urban areas. Nonetheless, this new technology and agent applications may lead to the emergence of self-interested car owners, who will care more about their own welfare than the social welfare of their peers. These car owners will try to manipulate their agents such that they transmit false data to their peers. Using a simulation environment, which models a real transportation network in a large city, we demonstrate the benefits that are achieved by self- interested agents if no countermeasures are implemented. We then proceed to describe the mechanisms for minimizing the effect of the malicious agents on other agents in the network.

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