Game Theoretic Notions of Fairness in Multi-party Coin Toss

Coin toss has been extensively studied in the cryptography literature, and the well-accepted notion of fairness (henceforth called strong fairness) requires that a corrupt coalition cannot cause non-negligible bias. It is well-understood that two-party coin toss is impossible if one of the parties can prematurely abort; further, this impossibility generalizes to multiple parties with a corrupt majority (even if the adversary is computationally bounded and fail-stop only).

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