A Proposed Probabilistic Extension of the Halpern and Pearl Definition of ‘Actual Cause’

Joseph Halpern and Judea Pearl ([2005]) draw upon structural equation models to develop an attractive analysis of ‘actual cause’. Their analysis is designed for the case of deterministic causation. I show that their account can be naturally extended to provide an elegant treatment of probabilistic causation. 1. Introduction2. Preemption3. Structural Equation Models4. The Halpern and Pearl Definition of ‘Actual Cause’5. Preemption Again6. The Probabilistic Case7. Probabilistic Causal Models8. A Proposed Probabilistic Extension of Halpern and Pearl’s Definition9. Twardy and Korb’s Account10. Probabilistic Fizzling11. Conclusion Introduction Preemption Structural Equation Models The Halpern and Pearl Definition of ‘Actual Cause’ Preemption Again The Probabilistic Case Probabilistic Causal Models A Proposed Probabilistic Extension of Halpern and Pearl’s Definition Twardy and Korb’s Account Probabilistic Fizzling Conclusion

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