The Structure of Intercorporate Unity in American Business

This paper examines the structure of intercorporate unity in the United States through an analysis of interlocking directorates. Our findings suggest that the major organizing institutions within the corporate world are the largest New York commercial banks, themselves united by a small number of prominent insurance companies. These institutions lend an order to corporate affairs and maintain a loose unity among firms. Although sources of conflict remain, patterns of director interlocks emphasize the capacity for cohesion supplied by the financial sector and suggest that mechanisms for conflict resolution reside within U.S. business.

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