A Theory of Friendly Boards

We analyze the consequences of the board's dual role as advisor as well as monitor of management. Given this dual role, the CEO faces a trade-off in disclosing information to the board: If he reveals his information, he receives better advice; however, an informed board will also monitor him more intensively. Since an independent board is a tougher monitor, the CEO may be reluctant to share information with it. Thus, management-friendly boards can be optimal. Using the insights from the model, we analyze the differences between sole and dual board systems. We highlight several policy implications of our analysis.

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