Strong and Weak Acyclicity in Iterative Voting

We cast the various different models used for the analysis of iterative voting schemes into a general framework, consistent with the literature on acyclicity in games. More specifically, we classify convergence results based on the underlying assumptions on the agent scheduler (the order of players) and the action scheduler (the response played by the agent).

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