Do All and Only Causes Raise the Probabilities of Effects

[Introduction] According to probabilistic theories of causation, causes raise the probabilities of their effects. Opponents of probabilistic theories of causation offer putative counterexamples. A moment's reflection should lead us to expect such counterexamples to be of two types: (1) causes that appear not to raise the probabilities of their effects; and (2) events that appear to raise the probabilities of other events, without causing those events. Almost all of the cases that have been discussed in the literature have been of the first sort; these can be effectively handled using resources that are already available. Counterexamples of the second sort, which have been largely ignored, still pose a threat. I will explore some options for avoiding these counterexamples, and more important, argue that they raise fundamental questions about the nature of indeterministic causation-questions that transcend issues about the correctness of any particular philosophical theory.