Megaproject Policy and Planning: Problems, Causes, Cures

This paper focuses on problems in megaproject policy and planning and their causes and possible cures. After considerations of methodology, the paper first identifies as a main problem in megaproject development pervasive misinformation about the costs, benefits, and risks involved. A consequence of misinformation is cost overruns, benefit shortfalls, and waste. Second, the paper explores the causes of misinformation and finds that political-economic explanations best account for the available evidence: planners and promoters deliberately misrepresent costs, benefits, and risks in order to increase the likelihood that it is their projects, and not the competition's, that gain approval and funding. This results in the "survival of the unfittest," where often it is not the best projects that are built, but the most misrepresented ones. Finally, the paper presents measures for reforming megaproject policy and planning with a focus on better planning methods and improved governance structures, the latter being more important.

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