论文信息 - The Resale-Proof Trade of Information as a Stable Standard of Behavior - An Application of the Theory of Social Situations

The Resale-Proof Trade of Information as a Stable Standard of Behavior - An Application of the Theory of Social Situations

The theory of social situations due to Greenberg is applied to information trading. The solution concept, defined by Nakayama, Quintas, and Muto as a resale-proof trade, is shown to be derived as a unique stable standard of behavior for a situation which we call the information trading situation.

Shigeo Muto | Mikio Nakayama | M. Nakayama | S. Muto

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