Agency and Self-Enforcing Contracts

This paper studies the role of agency in the self-enforcement of interfirm contracts. When interfirm transactions are carried out by the agents rather than the owners, the agents' incentive to breach a contract for the benefit of their firm is typically lower than that of the owners if doing so entails a personal cost or a loss of private benefits. Thus agency has a commitment value in making contracts self-enforcing. The cost of agency is the typical moral hazard problem. Implications are drawn for transition economies in which formal institutions for contract enforcement are weak.

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