Speaking to Theorists and Searching for Facts: Tax Morale and Tax Compliance in Experiments

A significant body of research has been accumulated concerning tax morale and tax compliance. This paper takes a stroll through the experimental findings, focussing on personal income. After briefly discussing the traditional topic of deterrence the main focus is on the social and institutional factors which until now have received only limited attention. Copyright 2002 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd

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