Overvaluation and the Choice of Alternative Earnings Management Mechanisms

ABSTRACT In this study I examine how the degree and duration of overvaluation affect management's use of alternative within-GAAP earnings management, restrictions on further exploitation of within-GAAP accruals management, and subsequent non-GAAP earnings management. Further, I examine how one type of earnings management segues into another type as overvaluation persists. I present evidence that the longer the firm is overvalued, the greater is the amount of total earnings management. I also find that managers engage in accruals management in the early stages of overvaluation before moving to real transactions management, in order to sustain their overvalued equity. Finally, I find that the longer a firm is overvalued, the more likely it is to engage in one of the most egregious forms of earnings management, non-GAAP earnings management. Collectively, the results suggest that the duration of firm overvaluation is an important determinant of managements' choice of alternative earnings management mechanisms...

[1]  E. Edwards,et al.  The Theory and Measurement of Business Income , 1961 .

[2]  David F. Larcker,et al.  On the Use of Instrumental Variables in Accounting Research , 2008 .

[3]  D. Hirshleifer,et al.  Do Investors Overvalue Firms with Bloated Balance Sheets? , 2004 .

[4]  Paul J. Simko,et al.  The Balance Sheet as an Earnings Management Constraint , 2002 .

[5]  Patricia M. Dechow,et al.  Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC* , 1996 .

[6]  D. Cohen,et al.  Accrual-Based and Real Earnings Management Activities Around Seasoned Equity Offerings , 2008 .

[7]  Krishna G. Palepu,et al.  Information Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure and the Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature , 2000 .

[8]  J. Jiambalvo Discussion of “Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC”* , 1996 .

[9]  Katherine A. Gunny,et al.  The Relation between Earnings Management Using Real Activities Manipulation and Future Performance: Evidence from Meeting Earnings Benchmarks , 2009 .

[10]  Edward I. Altman,et al.  FINANCIAL RATIOS, DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS AND THE PREDICTION OF CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY , 1968 .

[11]  Charles E. Wasley,et al.  Performance Matched Discretionary Accrual Measures , 2002 .

[12]  M. W. Nelson,et al.  Evidence from Auditors About Managers' and Auditors' Earnings-Management Decisions , 2001 .

[13]  Hong Xie THE MISPRICING OF ABNORMAL ACCRUALS , 2001 .

[14]  Jap Efendi,et al.  Why Do Corporate Managers Misstate Financial Statements? the Role of Option Compensation and Other Factors , 2007 .

[15]  Andrew J. Leone,et al.  The Importance of Distinguishing Errors from Irregularities in Restatement Research: The Case of Restatements and CEO/CFO Turnover , 2008 .

[16]  Mechanisms to Meet/Beat Analyst Earnings Expectations in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Eras , 2007 .

[17]  Michael L. Ettredge,et al.  How Do Restatements Begin? Evidence of Earnings Management Preceding Restated Financial Reports , 2010 .

[18]  René M. Stulz,et al.  Firm size and the gains from acquisitions , 2004 .

[19]  Evan W. Anderson,et al.  Do Heterogeneous Beliefs Matter for Asset Pricing , 2005 .

[20]  M. C. Jensen,et al.  Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity , 2005 .

[21]  John D. Phillips,et al.  Earnings Management Strategies and the Trade‐Off between Tax Benefits and Detection Risk: To Conform or Not to Conform? , 2009 .

[22]  Ming Dong,et al.  Does Investor Misvaluation Drive the Takeover Market , 2006 .

[23]  E. Fama,et al.  Industry costs of equity , 1997 .

[24]  Patricia M. Dechow,et al.  Are Benchmark Beaters Doing Anything Wrong? , 2000 .

[25]  James A. Ohlson Earnings, Book Values, and Dividends in Equity Valuation* , 1995 .

[26]  The Interaction between Accrual Management and Hedging: Evidence from Oil and Gas Firms , 2002 .

[27]  James N. Myers,et al.  What is the Intrinsic Value of the Dow? , 1997 .

[28]  G. Maddala Limited-dependent and qualitative variables in econometrics: Introduction , 1983 .

[29]  William R. Baber,et al.  Modeling Discretionary Accrual Reversal and the Balance Sheet as an Earnings Management Constraint , 2011 .

[30]  Pervin K. Shroff,et al.  Equity Undervaluation and Decisions Related to Repurchase Tender Offers: An Empirical Investigation , 2000 .

[31]  Amy Y. Zang,et al.  Evidence on the Trade-Off between Real Activities Manipulation and Accrual-Based Earnings Management , 2011 .

[32]  J. Francis,et al.  SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURES , 1994 .

[33]  Douglas J. Skinner,et al.  Earnings Momentum and Earnings Management , 2006 .

[34]  M. W. Nelson,et al.  How Are Earnings Managed? Examples from Auditors , 2003 .

[35]  Peter Ove Christensen,et al.  'Cost Of Capital' in Residual Income for Performance Evaluation , 2000 .

[36]  Charles M. C. Lee,et al.  Accounting valuation, market expectation, and cross-sectional stock returns , 1998 .

[37]  Frank Moers,et al.  The Issue of Endogeneity within Theory-Based, Quantitative Management Accounting Research , 2007 .

[38]  Jeffrey J. Burks,et al.  Accounting Restatements and the Timeliness of Disclosures , 2011 .

[39]  Sugata Roychowdhury,et al.  Earnings Management Through Real Activities Manipulation , 2006 .

[40]  Vernon J. Richardson,et al.  Determinants of Market Reactions to Restatement Announcements , 2001 .

[41]  Gregory B. Waymire,et al.  Investor Protection Under Unregulated Financial Reporting , 2003 .

[42]  Thomas Z. Lys,et al.  Real and Accrual-Based Earnings Management in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes Oxley Periods , 2004 .

[43]  Shivaram Rajgopal,et al.  The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting , 2005 .

[44]  Hemang Desai,et al.  The Reputational Penalty for Aggressive Accounting: Earnings Restatements and Management Turnover , 2004 .

[45]  S. Viswanathan,et al.  Valuation waves and merger activity: The empirical evidence ☆ , 2005 .

[46]  Richard G. Sloan Do Stock Prices Fully Reflect Information in Accruals and Cash Flows About Future Earnings , 1998 .

[47]  William M. Cready,et al.  Managing Earnings Using Classification Shifting: Evidence from Quarterly Special Items , 2010 .

[48]  Katherine A. Gunny,et al.  The Relation Between Earnings Management Using Real Activities Manipulation and Future Performance: Evidence from Meeting Earnings Benchmarks*: Real Activities Manipulation and Future Performance , 2010 .

[49]  Jan Barton,et al.  Does the Use of Financial Derivatives Affect Earnings Management Decisions , 2001 .

[50]  Manu Gupta,et al.  Overvaluation and Earnings Management , 2009 .

[51]  N. Travlos,et al.  Corporate Takeover Bids, Methods of Payment, and Bidding Firms' Stock Returns , 1987 .

[52]  P. Schmidt,et al.  Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics. , 1984 .

[53]  Randolph P. Beatty,et al.  Earnings management and the underperformance of seasoned equity offerings , 1998 .

[54]  Discussion of: "Investor protection under unregulated financial reporting" (by Jan Barton and Gregory Waymire) , 2004 .

[55]  Gopal V. Krishnan,et al.  Do Models of Discretionary Accruals Detect Actual Cases of Fraudulent and Restated Earnings? An Empirical Evaluation , 2008 .

[56]  Thomas Z. Lys,et al.  Empirical Research on Accounting Choice , 2001 .