Nature and place of crime scene management within forensic sciences.

This short paper presents the preliminary results of a recent study aimed at appreciating the relevant parameters required to qualify forensic science as a science through an epistemological analysis. The reader is invited to reflect upon references within a historical and logical framework which assert that forensic science is based upon two fundamental principles (those of Locard and Kirk). The basis of the assertion that forensic science is indeed a science should be appreciated not only on one epistemological criteria (as Popper's falsification raised by the Daubert hearing was), but also on the logical frameworks used by the individuals involved (investigator, expert witness and trier of fact) from the crime scene examination to the final interpretation of the evidence. Hence, it can be argued that the management of the crime scene should be integrated into the scientific way of thinking rather than remain as a technical discipline as recently suggested by Harrison.

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