Determinants of the decision to appeal against motor bodily injury judgements made by Spanish trial courts

Automobile bodily injury disputes represent one of the main causes of litigation faced by Spanish Courts. In this paper a multinomial model is implemented to analyse which factors determine the decision to appeal against the verdicts of trial courts. Use of a dataset of motor insurance claims revealed differences between the determinants of a claimant's decision to appeal and those of insurers. Among other results it is shown that discrepancies regarding the permanent disability sustained affect the insurer's decision to appeal. In contrast, the claimant pays more attention to differences in the stated temporary disability. Evidence of the claimant's higher risk-averse behaviour is found. Conclusions are drawn regarding which factors could reduce the percentage of appealed cases.

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