论文信息 - A Value with Incomplete Communication

A Value with Incomplete Communication

The aim of this paper is to present a new value of a cooperative game for the case of limited communication between players. The communication system we consider may be represented by a simple graph, that is, only pairwise meetings can occur and some of them are not permitted. An associated game is defined and the value has to verify a consistency axiom.

Gerard Hamiache | Gérard Hamiache

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