PUF as a sensor

The idea to use physical unclonable function (PUF) as a sensor is proposed. Environment-dependent behavior of PUF, which is conventionally unwanted, is used for sensing. Such PUF-based sensor has advantages over ordinary sensors. As a proof of concept, a voltage sensor is prototyped using an ASIC implementation of glitch PUF. The performance of the PUF-based sensor is evaluated by injecting pulses to power supply. The experiment emulates a hostile environment in which an attacker is attempting to inject fault. As a result, the PUF-based sensor successfully detects the injected pulses at high accuracy.

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