False-name-proof combinatorial auction protocol: Groves Mechanism with SubModular Approximation
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Makoto Yokoo | Atsushi Iwasaki | Toshihiro Matsutani | M. Yokoo | Atsushi Iwasaki | Toshihiro Matsutani
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