Market-aware agents for a multiagent world

A computational market is any collection of software agents interacting through a price system. Markets can provide effective allocation of resources for a variety of distributed environments, and economic analysis is a powerful design tool for interaction mechanisms. The spread of computational markets puts a premium on market-aware agents, and presents a case for market awareness on the part of agent developers and AI researchers as well. © 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

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